In 2016, my colleague Mads Walther-Hansen and I presented a conference paper entitled 'Being in a Virtual World: Presence, Environment, Salience, Sound' (WaltherHansen and Grimshaw 2016). In it, we discussed the role of sound in the development of presence in virtual worlds such as those forming the basis for computer games.
<1> Introduction
In 2016, my colleague Mads Walther-Hansen and I presented a conference paper entitled 'Being in a Virtual World: Presence, Environment, Salience, Sound' (WaltherHansen and Grimshaw 2016) . In it, we discussed the role of sound in the development of presence in virtual worlds such as those forming the basis for computer games.
That sound does indeed play a significant role in the formation of the feeling of presence should not surprise anyone but our interest was in how sound played this role and this led us to formulate a number of proposals regarding that process which arose from answers we put forward to various questions that, we claimed, were fundamental and necessary for answering the overriding question of how presence is formed. These questions revolved around definitions of sound, environment, and virtual world, factors such as metaphor and saliency, and conceptions of self and nonself and the localization of sound.
However, one aspect that we did not deal with is that of imagination in the context of sound and presence and, on reflection, it seems to me that some manner of imagination related to sound must be a significant factor in the formation of the feeling of presence not only when the available sensations, as a set, are multi-modal but also when sound provides access to and describes a sensorial world that need not be seen or sensed in any other modality for that world to be actual and present in some form to the sensor.
This chapter, then, looks at imagination in the context of sound and presence in both virtual and actual worlds. It builds upon the framework that Walther-Hansen and I established in our paper and which itself was constructed on other frameworks and theories such as those concerning metaphor, sonic virtuality, embodiment, and perceptual hypotheses. Thus, before I can proceed to focus on imagination and to bring it into a conceptual framework of presence, I need to briefly survey the already identified building blocks of that framework that are relevant to my thinking here.
<1> Sonic Virtuality
In a 2015 book, Tom Garner and I set out our thinking on sound that we encapsulated under the concept sonic virtuality (Grimshaw and Garner 2015) . This section is a very brief introduction to the concept; further details can be found in the above publication as well as in Grimshaw (2015) .
At the core of sonic virtuality is a definition of sound that describes it as an emergent perception arising from a sonic aggregate of external factors and internal factors. External factors include perceptions deriving from sensations from the external world while internal factors include memory, experience, knowledge, reason, and, importantly in this context, imagination. This is clearly a definition that is at odds with the standard acoustics definition where sound is an " [o] scillation in pressure, stress, particle displacement, particle velocity etc., propagated in a medium with internal forces (e.g., elastic or viscous) or the superposition of such propagated oscillation" (American National Standard 2013).
1 For Garner and me, therefore, this standard definition describes a sound wave rather than a sound.
The sensation (and then perception) of a sound wave can be part of the sonic aggregate but it requires internal factors (prior experience of sound waves, whether similar or not, and reasoning about their origins and so forth) to actualize as sound the virtuality (potential) present in the aggregate and thus it is only at this point of emergence that we can truly describe a sound as having meaning and, therefore, it is only at this point that an affordance becomes available (for the sense of presence, for example).
A sound wave, though, is not necessary to the emergence of sound. In other words, auditory or aural imagery is itself sound. This does not mean that no external factors are present in the sonic aggregate as sound emerges; it might be that the visual modality plays a role. This happens in many situations and can be experimentally observed by monitoring activity in the auditory cortex when watching an action that has accompanying sound waves compared to when watching the action muted (e.g., Bunzeck et al. 2005; Hoshiyama et al. 2001; Voisin et al. 2006 ).
Of particular importance here, is sonic virtuality's explanation of sound localization. In acoustics, sound localization is the determination of direction of sound (wave) travel relative to the listener in order to determine in which direction lies the vibrating object that is the source of the sound (wave). For example, the sound wave of an alarm travels through the air to our ears and, depending on a number of factors such as frequency, angle of wave incidence to our pinnae, and time of arrival and/or intensity differences of the wave at each ear, we can assess the direction of travel of the sound wave. In this way, in addition to the range estimation that comes with experience, we can discern reasonably accurately the direction the sound wave is coming from and, if we choose to look and the alarm is within sight, the location of the alarm itself.
Sonic virtuality takes a different approach to the process of localization of sound. In this case, if the emergent perception that is sound arises from a sonic aggregate that includes a sound wave, sound is then actively located (that is, placed)
by cognitive processes on the likely origin of the sound wave. In most cases this will be the actual origin of the sound wave; the sound of a telephone ringing is perceived and so it makes experiential sense to locate the sound on the telephone (seen or unseen) that stands in the corner of the room rather than the person you are talking to.
But, perhaps increasingly so in modern times, we are able to locate sound at some point elsewhere than where the source of the sound wave lies. 2 This is not only in the rarely experienced case of ventriloquism, where the effect in the field of psychoacoustics is known as the audio-visual proximity effect or the ventriloquism effect (e.g., Warren et al. 1981) , but also in common situations such as when watching a television show or sitting in the cinema. The latter case has been described by Chion (1994) as synchresis; the process of translocating the sensed location of sound waves from cinema loudspeakers to a perceived location centred on the action that takes place on screen because that is where it makes experiential sense to place it. In this context, the visual modality and prior knowledge of the cinematic experience control the outcome of the sound localization and it is partly for this reason that, in the theory of sonic virtuality, the sonic aggregate from which sound emerges includes contributing elements of other modalities such as the visual and factors such as knowledge and experience.
<1> Environment, Presence, and Perceptual Hypotheses
Particularly in the literature dealing with digital games and virtual reality (and not least the related discussions on immersion and presence) there is a synonymic relationship between the concepts of environment and world. Because WaltherHansen and I wished to explore the process of attaining presence, we found it useful to distinguish between environment and world such that, where the world comprises the set of all sensory objects and events, whether they are currently being sensed by one person or not, the environment is a perceptual construct (arising from a conjunction of sensation and cognition) that provides a metonym of a nonself within which our self can be present. This differentiation, and contingent conceptualization, is worthwhile exploring in greater detail because it provides a foundation stone to the discussion of imagination that is the focal point of this chapter (an extended explanation and argument can be found in Walther-Hansen and Grimshaw [2016] ).
The view of the world used here is as a set of sensory things; objects that can potentially be sensed either through direct interaction with them (or indirectly and at a remove through the events these objects are involved in). Touch, for example, is a means to the former whereas sound waves are a vector for the latter although, like sound waves, touch can be an indirect sensory means to the perception of events and objects other than those directly in contact with the sensor. This set of sensory things, though, is not sensed in its entirety by any one person due to the limits of sensory horizons. Thus, one needs a concept of multiple subsets of sensory things, subsets of the world, that are available to be sensed by one or more sensors while other sensors are excluded from this experience. Furthermore, despite these subsets of sensory things being available to sense, each individual sensor has their own saliency horizons within which he or she is made aware of or chooses to be aware of particular sensory things. Thus, the salient world, the set of sensory things drawn from the immediate sensory world of which the sensor is aware.
The perception of the salient world comprises the basis of the environment.
That is, the environment in this concept is a dynamic perceptual construct that arises from the confluence of cognition (especially experience, memory, and reasoning) and sensations from the salient world. In terms of presence, the environment is the perception of that salient world within which we can act -an enactive space -and thus interact with the things in the salient world. This notion of the ability to act and interact with the world derives from a definition of presence devised by Slater who, writing about presence in virtual worlds, states that presence is "the extent to which the unification of simulated sensory data and perceptual processing produces a coherent 'place' that you are 'in' and in which there may be the potential for you to act" (2003, 2) .
To forge a close link between environment as perceptual construct and presence, Walther-Hansen and I made use of the work of Waterworth and Waterworth who touch on the notion of salience when suggesting that presence arises "from an active awareness of our embodied environment in a present world around us" (2014, 590) . 4 Waterworth and Waterworth actually define presence as that feeling that "distinguishes self from the nonself" (2014, 589). Walther-Hansen and I, while recognizing the utility of distinguishing self from nonself in the context of presence, rather than accepting the notion that it is presence itself that is the basis for this distinction, prefer to suggest that "it is the process of distinguishing the self from the nonself (discovering those parts of the world which we can act within and upon) that leads to the feeling of presence" (Walther-Hansen and Grimshaw 2016). Thus, it is the dynamic perception (emergent creation) of the environment that leads to presence and this is a process that involves a probing of the salient world, for example through the act of localization of sound (in the sonic virtuality sense).
Walther-Hansen and I state that: "the environment functions as a metonym for the nonself, a nonself that is the world beyond ourselves" (2016). Thus, in looking at metaphorical relationships between hearing and other modalities (e.g., the use of terms such as thick, dry, sweet, bright, and so on as descriptors for sound), we extended the metaphorical explanation to the concept of environment. Rather than being a synecdoche of the nonself -the world of sensory things beyond our selveswe describe the environment as a metonym because it is a conceptual perception rather than a thing or set of things; it has an implicit, conceptual association with the nonself rather than an explicit, actual association.
There is one more building block to briefly deal with before I can turn my attention to imagination. In our thesis, presence in a world (actual or virtual) is the end result of a process of individuating self from nonself; this distinction is arrived at by an emergent perceptual process that forms an environment that functions as a metonym of the nonself. This process is driven by a constant probing of the salient world (as with sound localization in the sonic virtuality sense). The question that arises, then, is how and why this probing occurs.
To begin to answer this, Walther-Hansen and I turned to thinking on embodied cognition and perceptual hypotheses. Taking the latter first, the generation and selection of hypotheses as models of the sensory world around us has been used to explain the acquiring of knowledge about actual worlds (see, for example, Clark 2013) and has already been tied to presence in virtual worlds such as those generated by virtual reality systems. Slater suggests that competing signals from different environments (i.e., actual world and virtual world) and the selection of one hypothesis as a model of the environment over another is what forms the basis for action in a particular environment. Indeed, Slater claims that presence itself is "a perceptual mechanism for selection between alternate hypotheses" (2002, 435) . These hypotheses are sensory or gestalt models of different worlds, worlds within which there is potential to act. However, as noted above, Slater (2003) describes presence as an assessment of the potential to act in a coherent place; presence arises from the extent of the unification of sensory data and perceptual processing. In other words, presence derives from the formation and selection of hypotheses that are models of the world in which we can act.
This contradicts Slater's earlier statement that presence is the mechanism for the selection (and thus is causal to that selection). It is, however, the view that
Walther-Hansen and I take: "presence arises in part from the selection of one hypothesis over the other(s) and this we equate to a useful distinction between self and nonself, a distinction that is fundamental to the ability to act within and upon a world of things external to self" (2016). Our logic for this is: that if presence is indeed the feeling of being in and having the potential to act upon an external world of sensory things, then that world must be modeled, defined, and selected by the brain before presence arises. In this we equate the selected hypothesis with our concept of environment as a metonym for the nonself. I am now at the point of being able to bring imagination into a conceptual framework of presence focusing on the role of sound. To summarize those building blocks of the framework that I presented above:
• Sound is conceived of as an emergent perception that is formed from a sonic aggregate
• The sonic aggregate comprises external factors such as sound waves and light and other sensory vectors accounting for the cross-modality of sound and internal factors such as memory, experience, knowledge, reason, imagination, and so forth
• Within this concept of sound, the localization of sound is the locating of the emergent sound on likely sound wave sources in the immediate sensory world
• World is distinguished from environment and the salient world is a sensory world comprising that subset of the world of sensory things of which the sensor is aware
• The environment is a dynamic, best-fit, perceptual hypothesis of that salient world and is a metonym for the nonself that is the salient world
• The localization of sound is a means of probing the salient world, the nonself, that aids in the formation of hypotheses
• The creation of the environment takes place under time constraints because of the evolutionary requirement to be present in the salient world
• Presence arises from an individuation of the self from the nonself, a process that is contingent on the creation of an environment.
In conceiving of sonic virtuality, Garner and I conceptualized the sonic aggregate as comprising two components: the exosonus and the endosonus. While this provides a useful framework with which to describe how we perceive sound (whether the emergence of that perception is driven by sound waves in the exosonus or whether the sound derives purely from the endosonus and so is imagined sound), we also had an eye towards how the concept might be used in the design of audio for virtual worlds particularly in light of developments regarding biofeedback in such worlds.
Furthermore, we tentatively suggested that the model we conceived of for sound might also be extended to other modalities. I now wish to explore that thought a little further here and to highlight the role that imagination plays in the creation of the environment. Again, this theoretical (and admittedly speculative) exploration is undertaken not only as a means to describe how we perceive presence in the actual salient world but also to provide a framework within which to further design the immersive technology of virtual worlds, worlds that aim to support a similar sense of presence.
I begin by stating that the environment comprises (conceptually) two dimensions that I term the exo-environment and the endo-environment. As with the exosonus and the endosonus of the sonic aggregate, the exo-environment comprises the sensory input and the endo-environment the cognitive input. Together, they form an environmental aggregate, a dynamic soup of bottom-up sensory information and top-down cognitive processing of that information according to experience, memory, reasoning, and so on. Hypotheses are modeled from the base material of this aggregate and the successful hypothesis is the emergent environment that is adequate (under time constraints) to provide the space in which to be present.
I furthermore wish to suggest that it is imagination that is the driving force to the process of hypothesis modeling that ultimately forms the environment. In this, sound, particularly the localization of sound in sonic virtuality terms, plays a lead role. Hypotheses that are formed from the environmental aggregate are, as with any hypothesis, imaginings of what might be; in this case, imaginative models of the salient world. The localization of sound within these proto-environments is a means to sketch out, to imagine, the three-dimensional enactive space in which we can potentially be present and this is especially the case when the salient world is in large part unseen. Where Massumi suggests that the emergence of the Kanizsa Triangle is caused by the resolution of "a force field of emergence" (2014, 62), I suggest that it is imagination that forms the basis of the resolution of tension in the virtual potential of the environmental aggregate. In the cognitive processing of the environmental aggregate, the endo-environment works imaginatively to provide form and meaning and spatiality to the exo-environment. While I describe this further below with the use of examples, the localization of sound is a case in point. The sensation of sound waves leads to a cognitive probing of the salient world whereby our imagination (using experience, memory, reasoning, etc.) constructs imagery -visual and spatialthat forms the basis for the imaginative hypothesis-modeling that ultimately leads to the emergent environment.
I do not suggest that it is sound alone that provides spatiality to the emergent environment. Clearly, the visual modality, the contributive effects of parallax and scaling, plays a significant role and it often acts in conjunction with sound, the two modalities having a strong spatial resonance together. Indeed, it has been noted before that there is a transitivity in the spatial sense of the acoustic dimension of the salient world towards the visual dimension. In suggesting that the development of medieval perspective was an expansion of the auditory into the visual world -"Perspective translated into visual terms the depths of acoustic space" (68) -Carpenter and McLuhan (1970) point out this relationship in pictorial art. One can go back further to Diderot's idea of imaginative transportation of "the beholder's physical presence" to within a painting (in Fried 1980, 131-132) to find an early conception of presence founded upon the translation of the acoustic dimension into visual perspective.
In the environment in which we can feel present, whether the perception of pictorial art or the actual salient world, it is the space-forming properties of sound that, when imaginatively applied to the process of hypothesis modeling, provides the spatial dimension to the environment. Restating the ideas of Carpenter and McLuhan, Revill (2016) states that "space is made and shaped by the qualities of sound itself" (244). In the concept of the environment I present here, it is the imaginative localization of sound that forms the spatiality of the environment in which we are present.
<1>The It will be clear from the above description of the exo-environment and, especially, the unseen component of that exo-environment that I essentially disagree with Bronowski (1979) when he states that "most of the time we use vision to give us information about the world and sound to give us information about other people"
(10-11) and that imagination "is squarely rooted in [the eye] ... we cannot separate the special importance of the visual apparatus of man from his unique ability to imagine" (18); the special and perhaps more important faculty of the auditory apparatus to imagine was something Garner and I gave particular weight to in Sonic Virtuality and it is an importance that many others have also highlighted whether it is through work on the neurology of auditory imagery (e.g., Baddeley and Logie 1992; Bunzeck et al. 2005 ), work of a more philosophical or theoretical nature (e.g., Chion 1994; Sterne 2012), or even poetry (Wordsworth 1828 5 ) . I can model, in conjunction with the visual dimension, the objects, events, and developing narratives of the salient game world to a level that allows me to interact with them, to act in the game world, and so to be present in the environment of that world.
In the same manner in which the visualized acoustic space in a painting incorporating perspectival technique provides depth, in the creation of the environment we use the localization of sound to create the enactive space in which to be present. We call upon experience to provide imagery on which to localize sound.
Hence, in the first scenario I sketched out above, I am able to form a workable hypothesis that is the environment in which I provide the imagery of refrigerator, washing machine, doors, and stairway on which to localize the sensory input of sound waves. In the second scenario, my environment derives from the visual and audiovisual artifacts of the visual dimension and the sensation of sound waves that must be localized on the imagery of the unseen dimension of the exo-environment.
This imagery and the ability to so localize comes from the experience of actual worlds and virtual worlds and it is the spatiality of the environment thus fashioned through imagination that provides the differentiation between self and nonself and the enactive space in which to act. This is how the sense of presence is formed.
<1>In Conclusion
To conclude, I restate the main points in my thesis. In creating a sense of presence, the feeling of being within and able to act upon a world of sensory things, we perceptually create an environment that functions as a metonym of the salient world, the nonself compared to the self of the perceiver, and in which we are present. This environment is actualized under constraints of time from a series of increasingly refined hypothetical models of the salient world. The selected hypothesis, the perceived environment, comprises an exo-environment and an endo-environment. The former comprises a primarily visual dimension and a primarily unseen, auditory dimension. The latter is the cognitive dimension comprising experience, memory,
